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Abstract
In addition to moving people and goods, ships can spread
disease. Ship traffic may complement air traffic as a
source of import risk, and cruise ships – with large
passenger volumes and multiple stops – are potential
hotspots, in particular for diseases with long incubation
periods. Vessel trajectory data from ship Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS) is available online and it
is possible to extract and analyze this data. We illus-
trate this in the case of the current coronavirus epidemic,
in which hundreds of infected individuals have traveled
in ships captured in the AIS dataset. This real time
and historical data should be included in epidemiologi-
cal models of disease to inform the corresponding oper-
ational response.
1 Introduction
Faced with a global epidemic, there is a need to quickly
estimate potential routes for disease transmission in or-
der to prepare a public health response. In recent years,
the growing availability of big data sources has facilitated
the modeling of these potential routes. For example, pre-
vious studies have used mobile phone records, commut-
ing flow data, and airline flight matrices to identify possi-
ble disease hotspots, predict contagion patterns, and/or
estimate import risk [1, 2]. In this research, we high-
light another dataset – Automatic Identification System
(AIS) data containing historical and real-time ship tra-
jectories – as a complementary source of information on
possible transmission routes.
AIS data forms a global database of maritime traffic.
All passenger ships, international ships over 300 tons,
and cargo ships over 500 tons must be equipped with
an AIS transceiver, which reports dynamic information
about the ship’s position – such as its location, speed,
and course over ground – as well as static information
such as the ship’s identifiers, vessel type, and flag [3].
This data is collected by a network of land- and satellite-
based receivers and subsequently aggregated by third-
party providers, which redistribute the data and/or ren-
der it for viewing in a graphical user interface. AIS data
has been used in a diverse range of applications, includ-
ing monitoring for port security, detecting fishing behav-
ior, and studying search and rescue operations involving
migrant and refugee boats [4, 5, 6].
Currently, a standard approach to calculating disease
import risk at the international level is epidemic mod-
eling using flight network data. However, vessels can
also be global carriers for infected individuals and dis-
ease vectors. For example, the “Black Death” plague
outbreak in 1347, which killed an estimated 25 million
Europeans, is believed to have been spread throughout
Europe by merchant ships, possibly by rats on board and
their parasites [7]. Similarly, the travel of infected civil-
ians and soldiers along shipping routes is credited with
helping to spread the catastrophic 1918 Spanish flu epi-
demic, which killed an estimated 20 - 40 million people
worldwide [8].
Although passenger ships have largely been replaced
by airlines in the modern day, ships still represent a large
amount of traffic in island nations, and continue to play
an important role in international trade. Although ship
traffic patterns have transmission potentials that are dis-
tinct from airline traffic, they are not typically taken into
account in current epidemic models. Below, we discuss
two case studies in which shipping traffic is relevant to
the study of disease transmission.
2 Analysis
2.1 The 2017 Madagascar plague out-
break
In Fall 2017 Madagascar was struck by a plague epi-
demic, affecting an estimated 2,348 individuals and re-
sulting in 202 deaths [9]. Since Madagascar is an island
nation, we examined travel patterns in the AIS data
to estimate possible transmission routes through com-
mercial and cruise ships. Our methodology consisted of
gathering information from ports and cruise ships and
constructing an origin-destination matrix that captured
all trips between ports inside Madagascar (∼ 40% of ob-
served trips) and outside Madagascar (∼ 60%).
From 26 September to 26 October 2017 we identified
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
02
25
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  4
 M
ar 
20
20
(a) Origin-destination matrix for ships visiting Wuhan from
the 8th to 21st January 2020. Data source: UN Global
Platform AIS Database.
(b) The tracks of the cruise ship MS Westerdam from 1st
January to 19th February 2020. Data source: UN Global
Platform AIS Database. Basemap source: Stamen Design
and OpenStreetMap contributors.
Figure 1: Sample applications of AIS data
126 vessel departures from the main ports in Madagas-
car, including cargo vessels, tankers, tugs, and fishing
vessels. Interestingly from an epidemic risk perspec-
tive, long-range trips included destinations as diverse as
Mayotte, Mauritius, Reunion, Mozambique, France, and
China. A further analysis of cruise traffic specifically
found 6 cruises that were scheduled to arrive in Madagas-
car over the course of November 2017. Generally, these
cruises were scheduled to stop in more than one port, and
the number of passengers and crew members on board
was over 1,200 on average. These cruises therefore rep-
resent high-volume points of human contact which in
this case would have subsequently visited South Africa,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Seychelles, and Italy.
2.2 The 2020 coronavirus epidemic
Given the long incubation period of the disease and the
possibility of mild, asymptomatic cases, maritime traf-
fic has played a significant role in the current spread
of the coronavirus epidemic. In particular, experience
has shown that large cruise ships can become important
hotspots. Below are three scenarios in which AIS infor-
mation could be used to support further investigations
and risk modeling.
• Wuhan, the city at the center of the outbreak, is lo-
cated at the junction of the Yangtze and Han rivers.
Therefore, shipping traffic is one pathway by which
disease might spread out of the city. Using AIS data
from Exact Earth, we obtained all traffic from ships
that passed within 50km of Wuhan with a speed of
less than 2 knots for the period between 8 - 21 Jan-
uary 2020. All told, we identified 1,107 ships con-
necting 34 different ports across China and Japan
(see Figure 1a).
• Spain’s first case of the coronavirus was identified
in the Canary Islands, in a traveler who arrived
in La Gomera by ferry from Tenerife [10, 11]. In
addition to the islands’ air traffic connections, AIS
data analysis for 8 - 21 January 2020 showed that
ships passing by the Canary Islands were associated
with ports in 56 different countries, including fre-
quent travel to peninsular Spain, Morocco, Senegal,
Gibraltar, the UK, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
• The Diamond Princess cruise ship was quarantined
off the coast of Japan with approximately 3,700 in-
dividuals on board, and 621 people on the ship were
ultimately infected [12]. A second cruise ship, the
MS Westerdam, was repeatedly denied entry at port
for fear that there were infected individuals among
the 2,257 people onboard, and a passenger tested
positive for coronavirus only after the ship docked in
Cambodia, leading to fears that other infected but
asymptomatic individuals could spread new cases
(although the passenger has since tested negative)
[13, 14]. The locations of both ships are available in
real time and their travel paths can be reconstructed
using historical AIS traces (see Figure 1b). Similar
data on positions, historical travel paths, maximum
capacity, and expected ports of arrival could also be
extracted for other cruise ships in the region.
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3 Discussion
Ships represent a source of epidemic risk which might be
particularly relevant in port cities and island nations or
for diseases with long incubation periods. Our analysis of
data from Madagascar and the Canary Islands illustrates
that island shipping traffic has a broad reach (in these
cases, reaching three or more continents within a month)
and may potentially carry high volumes of passengers.
Even a landlocked city such as Wuhan saw a considerable
volume of river traffic in the two-week period prior to
quarantine.
AIS data makes it possible to visualize individual ship
trajectories, along with additional ship information such
as vessel type and size. It is simple to filter out, for in-
stance, passenger ships that might have stopped in cities
with high risk, as well as to account for their expected
arrival times in future ports. The ability to acquire such
information in real time might be of critical relevance for
operational responses to disease outbreaks.
The approach described in this communication repre-
sents a first step towards estimating the potential role
of vessel traffic in global disease spread. We assert that
ship origin-destination matrices can offer insights into
travel routes which may be overlooked when focusing on
flight path data alone, and should be considered when
modeling the spread of disease in port cities and island
nations. The availability of real-time and historical data
from commercial providers makes analysis of AIS data
feasible. Vessel trajectory data can be enhanced with
other sources of data on the number of passengers and
crew aboard tourist or commercial ships. Future work
should explore how adding shipping traffic to existing
flight network data changes the outcome of disease sim-
ulations and risk estimates.
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Appendix: Data and Methods
AIS data
Popular AIS data providers include ExactEarth, Fleet-
Mon, MarineTraffic, OrbComm, VesselFinder, and Ves-
selTracker [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. The frequency of
AIS readings varies, with some providers offering bet-
ter resolution than others; in our experience, we have
found that this resolution can range from approximately
one reading every two minutes to one reading per hour.
Furthermore, providers differ in their access to land- or
satellite-based receivers; typically, land-based receivers
detect ships within 15 - 20 (and up to 60) nautical miles
away [22], whereas satellite-based receivers are used to
monitor ships further out to sea.
Selecting AIS data for OD matrices
We first queried the AIS database to find the Maritime
Mobile Service Identities (MMSI) of all ships which had
passed within 50km of Wuhan, or 300km of the Canary
Islands, at a speed of less than 2 knots during our period
of interest (8 - 21 January 2020). Examples of observed
traffic in the areas of interest are shown in Figure 2, while
the regions used for the query are shown in Figure 3.
Given the resulting list of ship MMSIs, we then extracted
all trajectory points for these ships during the period
from 8 - 21 January, again retaining only points for which
the ships recorded a speed of less than 2 knots.
Filtering AIS data for OD matrices
We reduced the size of the AIS dataset using several cri-
teria. First, we removed ships with invalid MMSI, drop-
ping MMSI which were less than 9 digits in length and
MMSI which were associated with multiple different ves-
sel types (a sign that more than one ship might be using
the same MMSI). Next, we removed duplicate readings;
readings after which ships had moved less than 0.001 de-
grees in the vertical and horizontal directions from the
previous reading; and ships whose position jumped at a
rate of more than 1.7 degrees per hour (approximately
100 knots) in latitude or longitude between subsequent
position reports (another sign that more than one ship
might be using the same MMSI).
Building OD matrices from AIS data
Using the list of ports supplied by the World Port Index
[23], we next restricted our dataset to position readings
which fell within approximately 50km of a port, and as-
sociated each of the remaining points with its nearest
port. We then retrieved the port associated with the
ship’s previous location reading, dropping any connec-
tions between a port and itself. Finally, we aggregated
the port-to-port connections of individual ships to yield
an origin-destination (OD) matrix.
Figure 2: Snapshots of real-time plane and flight traffic
from Wuhan (above) and the Canary islands (below) in
February 2020. Source: UN Global Platform.
Figure 3: The radii used to select ships visiting Wuhan
(above) and the Canary Islands (below). Basemap
source: Google Maps.
5
